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There can be little doubt that surprising
findings have been emphasized in psychol-
ogy. To publish in top empirical psychol-
ogy journals, it is important for reviewers
to feel that the findings have a low prior
probability; i.e., that the findings were
improbable. My goal is to show that there
are different ways in which a finding can be
surprising and that the usual way does not
further the science of psychology.
Trafimow (2003) used the famous the-
orem by Bayes to show that if a surprising
prediction is confirmed by experiment, it
creates more of a difference between the
prior and posterior probability of a theory
than if an unsurprising prediction is con-
firmed by experiment. Intuitively, it seems
inescapable that if a theory makes surpris-
ing predictions that actually come out, this
is a more impressive accomplishment than
if a theory does not make surprising pre-
dictions. The history of science is replete
with examples of extremely important
experiments that successfully confirmed
surprising predictions made from theories
such as Einstein’s theory of relativity.
To understand my argument, it is
important to fully appreciate the notion
of auxiliary assumptions. As philosophers
have noted, theory-based predictions rely
on (1) the theory and (2) auxiliary
assumptions that provide the link between
non-observational terms in theories and
observational terms in predictions that
derive from theories. For example, in the
middle part of the nineteenth century,
many scientists felt that it was impossible
to test theories about the chemical com-
position of the stars because there was no
way to travel to a star to procure star mate-
rial for chemical analysis. However, sub-
sequent advances in spectroscopy made it
possible to connect light spectra to the
combinations of elements that generate
them. Thus, the advances in spectroscopy
provided auxiliary assumptions that could
be used to test theories about the chemical
composition of stars.
The reason for harping on auxiliary
assumptions, and particularly the auxil-
iary assumptions that determine method-
ology, is that their existence suggests
two dimensions regarding how surprising
theory-based predictions are. One dimen-
sion would pertain to how surprising the
theory is whereas the other dimension
would pertain to how surprising the aux-
iliary assumptions are. By considering the
extreme poles along these two dimensions,
it is easy to imagine four combinations
(but only the first two are important).
First, suppose that the theory is surprising
and the auxiliary assumptions are obvi-
ous, so that the surprising predictions are
surprising because of the theory. In that
case, there would be high confidence that
the predictions actually test the theory.
Therefore, if the predictions work out,
the theory would be considered to have
passed a strong test, and there would be
an impressive difference between its prior
and posterior plausibility. In this case,
empirical confirmation of surprising pre-
dictions constitutes a non-trivial advance
for psychology.
For example, consider the widely
accepted theory, often called “corre-
spondence bias” or the “fundamental
attribution error,” that there is a general
tendency for people to not pay atten-
tion to information about situations (e.g.,
see Jones, 1990 for a review). Trafimow
(1998) suggested a contradictory the-
ory that suggests that people pay a great
deal of attention to situations but that
researchers have not detected this because
their methods involved asking for judg-
ments about traits, which unintentionally
primed participants to not use informa-
tion about the situation. To avoid this
problem, Trafimow used a personmemory
paradigmwhereby participants were led to
believe that a target person was kind or
unkind either at work or at home, the
participants were subsequently presented
with congruent, and incongruent behav-
iors ostensibly performed at work or at
home, and later were asked to recall all
of the items. It had been well-established
by previous research that people tend to
recall information that is incongruent with
their attributions about people better than
congruent information. The empirical
issue at hand, then, was whether partici-
pants would recall incongruent behaviors
better than the congruent ones regard-
less of whether they were performed at
work or at home, or whether partici-
pants would exhibit a situation-specific
incongruity effect. Trafimow obtained the
surprising finding of a situation-specific
incongruity effect that contradicted the
widely accepted theory that people habit-
ually commit a fundamental attribution
error, and supported that people pay
much attention to situations after all.
The finding was not surprising at the
empirical level, as few would doubt that
in the paradigm Trafimow used, a general
expectancy should lead to a general incon-
gruity effect whereas a situation-specific
expectancy should lead to a situation-
specific incongruity effect. The surprise
was at the theoretical level—that par-
ticipants could so easily be induced to
form situation-specific expectancies given
the dominant assumption of a strong
tendency for people to not consider
situations.
Second, let us consider what I believe
to be the most usual case in psychology,
where the theory is not particularly sur-
prising but one or more auxiliary assump-
tions are. In more typical language, what
makes many psychology predictions sur-
prising is the prior unlikelihood that the
methodology actually would work, so that
when it works, reviewers are impressed.
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It is easy to imagine a colleague saying to
the experimenter, “Wow, you got that to
work!” But does this way of being surpris-
ing actually advance psychology? Consider
that if the theory is not surprising, it has a
pretty good prior probability of being true.
For a silly example, my “theory” (“empir-
ical generalization” might be a more accu-
rate description) that 6:00 news shows
have a tendency to come on at approx-
imately 6:00 would be judged by most
people to be likely to be true even without
any formal experiments. So if the theory is
already judged to be likely to be true, there
is little room for even the cleverest set of
experiments to make an impressive differ-
ence from prior to posterior probability.
At this point, I ask the reader to consider
the latest issue of his or her favorite empir-
ical psychology journal, and judge what
proportion of the articles in the journal
contained a surprising theory, or whether
the surprise was in the auxiliary assump-
tions. The same question, put another way,
is for the reader to consider whether the
surprise was at the level of the theory or
at the level of the experimental hypothesis.
Assuming that the reader would agree that
the surprise usually was not in the theory
itself, but rather that surprising auxiliary
assumptions are what led to the surpris-
ing predictions, did the article cause a large
change between subjective prior and pos-
terior judgments of how likely the theory
was to be true? If not, I would suggest that
not much was gained that was of impres-
sive scientific value.
Consider an example. Petty and
Cacioppo (1984) proposed the obvious
theory that sometimes people put more
effort into processing persuasive messages
and sometimes they put less effort into
doing so. After putting participants into
a mindset where they would put more
or less effort into processing persuasive
messages, Petty and Cacioppo presented
participants with more or fewer good
or poor arguments. At the theoretical
level, it is not surprising that inducing
participants to devote much versus lit-
tle processing effort would influence the
relative effectiveness of cues designed to
work better with much or little processing
effort. However, researchers at the time
considered it surprising that argument
quality and argument quantity would
function in these two ways, respectively.
Thus, the finding that argument quality
mattered more when participants devoted
more processing effort, and that argument
quantity mattered more when participants
devoted less processing effort, counted as
a surprising finding. But the surprise was
at the methodological level rather than at
the theoretical level.
A third possible combination is for
both the theory and the auxiliary assump-
tions to be surprising. This combination
rarely happens in psychology, and no cases
come immediately to mind. If it were to
happen, perhaps reviewers would think
that the author pulled a fast one on them.
And the fourth combination is for both the
theory and the hypothesis to be obvious, in
which case themanuscript probablywould
not be accepted by a top journal unless the
reviewers felt that they had an interest in
having the manuscript published, perhaps
because the manuscript cited their work in
a positive way.
In conclusion, we should be asking why
a surprising finding is surprising. If the
surprise results from the prior implausi-
bility of the theory, I would agree that
the surprising finding likely constitutes a
real contribution to science. However, if
the surprise is of the “you got that to
work!” variety, where the surprise resides
in the auxiliary assumptions, I am not
impressed. Researchers in other sciences,
such as physics, understand well the differ-
ence between different kinds of surprise. It
is high time for psychology researchers to
do so too.
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